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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




DELTA OIL COMPANY 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 
9708 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was an action on two promissory notes, each 
in the amount of $21,000, payable by the defendant 
corporation to the plain tiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LO"WER COURT 
The case was submitted to a jury on a special 
verdict, and judgment was entered by the court thereon 
for the plaintiff in the total amount of the two notes 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a dismissal of the case 
or a reversal of the judgment, or a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared 
in the trial court. 
Plaintiff, a United States citizen and resident of 
the state of Florida, brought suit in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County against the defendant, a Utah 
corporation, on September 29, 1960. Plaintiff's com-
plaint included two causes of action, each on a pro-
missory note in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand 
and no/100 Dollars ($21,000.00), which notes had been 
given by defendant to plaintiff both dated :\larch 11, 
1959 and payable at the Chase National Bank in 
Havana, Cuba. The note in the first cause of action "Tas 
payable September 11, 1959, and the note in the second 
cause of action on December 11, 1959. Defendant 
admitted nonpayment of these notes. 
Defendant corporation filed an ans,ver to this com-
plaint on December 2, 1960 containing the following six 
defenses; ( 1) Co1nplaint failed to state a cause of 
aetion; ( 2) X otes signed "Tithout corporate authority; 
(a) Notes satisfied in "Thole or part by stock delivered 
in paytnent of the same; ( 4) Failure of consideration~ 
( 5) Notes signed as a result of plaintiff's Inisrepresen-
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tutions; aud ( 0) Notes subject to (~uban law under 
\rhich there is no liability on the part of defendant. 
Defendant a1nended its answer on October 16, 
1961~ the day before this case came on for pretrial with 
a pleading \\Thich added several new defenses. The "sec-
ond defense'' and the ''third defense" alleged that a 
contract of sale between the plaintiff and defendant 
provided that all disputes arising from the contract were 
to be determined by the Courts and judges of the city 
of Havana, Cuba. Defendants second defense was that 
sole jurisdiction of actions between the parties was in 
the Havana, Cuba courts and its third defense was that 
even if the trial Court had jurisdiction it should not be 
exercised, for Cuba was a more convenient forum. 
Only those defenses material to this appeal and 
eYidence with respect thereto, will be mentioned. In the 
fifth defense, defendant alleged that some 42,000 shares 
of defendant's stock endorsed in blank had been 
delivered over to plaintiff's partner or agent as security 
for the two notes sued on, which stock had a value in 
excess of the notes and had been converted before the 
notes were due. The sixth defense alleged first no ade-
quate consideration for the notes because plaintiff had 
represented he had good title to the leasehold of a silica 
sand deposit sold defendant, when in fact plaintiff only 
bad reasonably good title; and second, failure of con-
sideration for the notes for plaintiff, as part of the con-
tract of sale 'vas g·iven the right to make required rental 
payments on the sand mine leases and defendant had 
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paid the rentals both prior to and after closing, until 
it became satisfied it would not be allo,ved to operate 
the mine under the regime of Fidel Castro, but that 
plaintiff although accepting payments did not transmit 
them to the owners allowing the consideration for the 
notes to subsequently become worthless, which, while 
after execution of contract of sale, was "prior to the time 
defendant elected to allow such consideration to become 
worthless." Defendant's seventh defense was that defen-
dant, if liable on the notes, was not liable for each in the 
sum of $21,000 in currency of the United States, but "is 
only liable in the sum of 42,000 pesos of the official 
currency of the Republic of Cuba at the time said notes 
became due." 
At the trial of the case, plaintiff introduced the two 
notes in evidence, together with a corporate resolution 
of defendant's Board of Directors authorizing their 
execution, and rested. ( R. 80, 90) . Defendant then 
called plaintiff as an adverse witness and followed him 
with Theo Doerrie, \Yho had been president of the 
defendant corporation and had handled all negotiations 
and transactions 'vith plaintiff on behalf of the corpora-
tion. The only other witness was Alice Forsberg, put on 
by plaintiff in rebuttal, 'vho 'vas an e1nployee of the 
Salt Lake office of the American Express Company. 
1\Irs. Forsberg through her \York knew the rate of 
exchange bet\veen An1erican dollars and Cuban pesos 
for the year 1959 and testified that during all the year 
1959 and up until February of 1960 the Cuban peso 
\vas at par "·ith the An1erican dollar. (R. 271, 272). 
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Defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff, a 
United States citizen then residing in Havana, Cuba, 
o'rned the leasehold of a valuable silica sand deposit 
located in ('1uba, together with certain mining equip-
alent, tnachinery and motor vehicles for operation of 
the sand n1ine. In August of I958, Jack Cayias, aU nited 
States citizen and a resident of Houston, Texas, negoti-
ated a deal with plaintiff in Cuba to take over the opera-
tion of plaintiff's sand mine. This agreement "·as verbal, 
and under it Cayias was to pay plaintiff $20,000, take 
oYer the monthly rental payments of the property, 
(totaling some $I008 a month) and get an operator for 
the mine with plaintiff retaining an interest in the profits 
"·ith Cayias. (R. II4, II5). Cayias gave plaintiff 
$4,000.00 in United States currency and about August 
28, 1968 paid the balance of $I6,000.00 by a check dra,vn 
on his account in the First Security Bank in Salt Lake 
City, lJtah. (R. 1I5, Ex. II). This check, on deposit 
by plaintiff, was returned for insufficient funds. Plaintiff 
gave Cayias additional time to make the payment but, 
after receiving the check back, required that Cayias make 
the required future monthly payments to him for trans-
mittal to the lessors. ( R. 196) . 
Fidell'1astro and his revolutionary forces took over 
the government of Cuba about January 1, 1959. (R. 
113). ''rithin a ,,·eek follo,ving this takeover, plaintiff 
received the $16,000.00 payment owing by Jack Cayias 
frotn a Steven 'Tan Gelder. (R. 109). He executed a 
receipt for this money to the Delta Oil Company "in 
return for check received from Jack c,ayias partial pay-
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ment of sand mine". (R. 112, Ex. 7). Although Van-
Gelder was at the time a substantial stockholder in Delta 
Oil Company ( R. 260) , according to Doerrie, Delta Oil 
had not decided to take over the property and did not 
become involved in the acquisition until March of 1959 
when a written contract was executed and the promissory 
notes subsequently delivered. (R. 213, 214, 255). 
The only agreement in 'vriting executed by the 
parties was dated March 10, 1959 and provided for the 
purchase by defendant and assignment by plaintiff of 
all of his interests in the silica sand deposit and leasehold 
estate and in the mining equipment, machinery, and 
vehicles used in the operation thereof. This contract was 
prepared in Spanish by the defendant's Cuban lawyer 
(Ex. 4) (R. 189) and an English copy was at the same 
time prepared (Ex. 5) for the benefit of the parties. 
(R. 102). This written contract signed by the parties 
in the defendant's office in HaYana, Cuba succeeded t"~o 
or three verbal deals plaintiff had made on the mine but 
not with defendant. (R. 127, 188). The English copy 
was believed by the parties to be the same as the Spanish 
one and was the copy that they relied on. (R. 103). 
Defendant was given credit for the $20,000.00 
theretofore paid plaintiff by Cayias and 'ran Gelder, 
and on March 11, 1959, it executed and delivered the t"~o 
notes sued on totaling $42~000 for the balance owing in 
money to planitiff. Plaintiff also received in writing a 
tilfo overriding royalty in the sand mine production. 
(R. 105~ 106, Ex. 6). 
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Defendant corporation approved and ratified the 
aetions of its president in acquiring the "valuable sand 
deposits in c~uba" and in signing notes for the balance 
of ~-t:! ,000 by a resolution adopted by its Board of Direc-
tors on April28, I959. (R. 233, Ex. 3). 
lT nder the terms of the written agreement of sale~ 
defendant 'vas required to make the future monthly pay-
nlents to the o'vners of the leasehold. (Ex. 5) . Instead 
of making these payments to the owners, defendant 
n1ade the1n to plaintiff as Cayias had done, after his 
check bounced. Plaintiff acknowledged receiving rental 
payments from Cayias and others up to the time the 
defendant took this responsibility over under the written 
contract and that defendant had made some rental pay-
ments thereafter. He couldn't recall how many or when 
these payments were made, but believed that he had paid 
over all he received to the lessors entitled thereto. ( R. 
139, 192) . Plaintiff produced checks showing payments 
by him to the land owners and the caretaker of the mine 
through April of I959. (R. I61, Ex. 17). 
Defendant produced proof of the following rental 
payments to plaintiff after the March lOth agreement: 
The first 'vas a receipt from plaintiff to Delta Oil Com-
pany for the April I, I959 rental payment of $1,258. 
(R. 165, Ex. I3). The next payment was by a check 
dated June I, I959 from defendant to plaintiff for 
$1008. (Ex. I2). Another receipt, undated, indicated 
pay·tnent of two months' payments of $I,008 each, total-
ling $2,0I6. (R. 192, Ex. IJ). The only other payment 
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by defendant to plaintiff was by check dated October 21, 
1959, from Theo Doerrie for $3,000, with a notation on 
it stating "Payments to Sid Jacobs for Delta Oil." 
(R. 162, 163, Ex. 15). This last check, according to 
Doerrie, was to take care of rental payments "~hich 'vere 
then several months delinquent. (R. 241, 242). 
Doerrie testified that there had been delivered at 
Jack Schenin's request 42,000 shares of stock in defend-
ant company as security for the two promissory notes 
given plaintiff by defendant, (R. 223, 225, 265) and that 
the two certificates representing these shares subse-
quently came in for transfer. (R. 168). He claimed he 
knew this stock had been transferred before he made the 
last payment of $3,000 on October 11, 1959, and that 
Schenin at that time admitted to him that he had trans-
ferred the stock. (R. 249). From the date the stock 
had been delivered until October 11, 1959, Doerrie said 
the market value of the shares had fluctuated from 15c 
to 87c. (R. 250). Defendant's counsel attempted to 
establish the date the stock had been transferred, and 
asked Doerrie if he had seen the transfer sheets from the 
company's registered transfer agent inN ew Jersey, but 
the court refused to permit such testimony. ( R. 246, 
247}. 
Plaintiff denied that Jack Schenin had any interest 
in the sand 1nine or the sale thereof to defendant, and 
that he "~as his partner. He further denied receiving 
any stock as security for the notes (R. 157-158) or 
having authorized anyone to accept security for the notes 
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GE his L~·half. (R. 195). D(;fendant did not have any 
rtcei pi or other e ,·idence that stock had been given as 
sL·L·urity ou the notes as claiined by it. ( R. 261). 
Defendant's agents examined the mine and the 
~quipn1ent, t..:achinery and vehicles and its operation 
before entering into the written purchase agreement, but 
ai't(;r the agree1nent defendant never took possession or 
\rent back to the 1nine. ( R. 230) . This was because 
defendant vt·as unable to obtain an operator for the mine. 
(R. 25t;). At the time of the delivery of the last $3,000.00 
payn1ent in October, 1959, defendant's president indi-
cated defendant was abandoning the mine and would 
rna1~e no further rental payments thereon. ( R. 240) . 
It \Vas admitted by defendant that the notes sued 
upon by the plaintiff had never been paid. (R. 260) . 
.L\._fter each note had become due, in September and 
Decernber, 1959, plaintiff contacted defendant's presi-
dent and had been promised the notes would be paid. 
(R. 200, 201). At no time did the mine owners or any 
representative of defendant advise the plaintiff that the 
lease had been lost or the leaseholds terminated, and that 
so far as plaintiff knew this had never occurred prior 
to defendant's abandonment. (R. 194, 195, 201). 
_iA_RGUMENT 
POIN'l" ONE 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF S.r\.LT 
I.u:ll{E COLT~;'r"\T HAD ~JURISDICTION OF 
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THIS CASE AND DID NOT ERR IN RE-
JECTING DEl"'ENDAN'T'S UNTIMELY 
CON'"fENTION 'l,HAT IT SHOULD NO'T 
EXERCISE SUCH JURISDIC'"fiON BE-
CAUSE OF A CONTRACTUAL PROVISION 
IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TH}~ 
PARTIES EXECU1_"'ED BEl--,ORE -t\.NY 
CAUSE OF AC'l,ION AROSE. 
POINT TWO 
THIS CASE WAS P R 0 P E R L Y 
BROUGHT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THAT COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN HEARING THIS CASE 
OVER THE DEFENDANT'S lJNTIMEL Y 
ASSERTION OF THE DOCTRINE 0}, 
FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
The defendant argued its first and second points 
together and plaintiff shall respond to both points in 
the same manner. Defendant urges under its first point 
that paragraph six of the contract of sale entered into 
between the two parties which resulted in the delivery 
of the notes sued on in this action, was a valid la"rful and 
enforceful provision "·hich the court should uphold. This 
provision read as follows: 
"Sixth: 'fhey renounce to their residence 
address and appoints the judges and courts of 
the C'ity of IlaYana for the interpretation of this 
doctUll~n t if any clain1 or con troYersy should 
. . 
a rise concerning it ... '· 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'l,his provision is not controlling as contended by 
defendant for divesting the court of jurisdiction or 
rcq u1r1ng a change of place of trial for the follo,ving 
reasons: 
.r\.. Suit bruur;ht on notes_, not contract. 
'rhis action by the plaintiff did not require the 
interpretation of the contract of March 11, 1959 con-
ta~;i~ng the litnitation clause, for it was brought on two 
separate agreements; the negotiable promissory notes 
executed by the defendant to the plaintiff. These notes 
contain no submission clause and are complete and in-
dependent documents in themselves. 
Under Cuban la"r' according to the affidavit of 
J. Justin Franco, submitted to the lower court for guid-
ance and information, it is usual for a promissory note 
to have its own submission clause if the parties desire 
to limit venue as is customary under Cuban law. The 
ai-fidavit, ho,vever~ goes on to indicate that the provision 
of Cuban law authorizing this is procedural only and 
found in the la''/S of civil procedure of Cuba. (R. 44). 
B. Such a ]Jrovi.Yion is contrary to public policy and 
void. 
Defendant acknowledges that the great weight of 
authority opposes its position and holds that such juris-
dictional provisions are unenforceable as against the 
public policy of the state, but cites two cases which indi-
cate exceptions to this majority view. The many cases 
~upporting the unenforceablity position are noted in 
11 
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three A.L.R. annotations covering this question found 
in 59 A.L.R. 1445, 107 A.L.R. 1060 and 56 A.L.R. 2<1. 
300. The general rule recited by these cases from nearly 
every jurisdiction is stated in .59 A.L.R. 1446 as follows: 
"the courts have quite uniformly refused to give 
effect to a stipulation in a contract limiting the 
jurisdiction of any action or proceeding with 
reference to the con tract to the courts, or a par-
ticular court, of another state or county or of 
another district in the same state, either as defeat-
ing the jurisdiction altogether or as a sufficient 
reason for declining jurisdiction; and, in spite of 
such provisions, have assumed jurisdiction if the 
action was of a transitory character, and the court 
otherwise had jurisdiction of the subject matter 
and the person of defendant. In some instances 
the courts, as subsequently shown, declare such 
a contract contrary to public policy as an un,var-
ranted derogation from the jurisdiction of the 
courts; and in others simply decline to giYe effect 
to it upon the ground that the matter pertains to 
the remedy, and is governed by the la,vs of the 
forum. The principle, as indicated, is applied 
whether the stipulation purports to confine the 
jurisdiction to the courts of a state or country 
other than that in 'vhich the question arises, or of 
another district of the same state; in other words, 
"Thether the question is of jurisdiction or venue." 
The two cases relied on by the plaintiff Harbis v. 
Cudahay Packiny Co._, 241 S.,,r. 921 and Mettenthal v. 
Masceyni, 66 N.E. 428 are clearly distinguishable. The 
Harbis case involved a "Tork1nen's cotnpensation situ-
ation arising under the la,vs of another state, and the 
Mettenthal ease 'vas a dispute bet,veen t'vo non-resident 
12 
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al:crl:-; \Yho had uo standing before the court except as a 
ntattcr of comity. 
'fhe present case \vas properly brought under the 
jurisd,cL:on and venue requirements of Utah law and 
d·, feudant does not contend otherwise, but merely that 
the lo\ver court should have refused to exercise its 
jurisdiction. 
Under its second point, defendant cites the case 
of 1\.rfuyer 'l'. Penn .llailroad Co.~ 17 4 F.2d 559, and sets 
forth a statement by Judge Learned Hand indicating 
that such contractual provisions are not "absolutely 
taboo, but only inYalid when unreasonable." This state-
Inent, it should be noted, was in a concurring opinion 
in the case which had been brought under the J1~ederal 
Employers Liability Act (FELA). The main opinion 
had simply held that a provision limiting jurisdiction 
in a contract signed by an injured employee to be 
contrary to provisions of the federal act. This question 
\ras later ruled upon and this main holding, upheld by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
.l-1lc.rander Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
(--.o.~ 339 U.S. 263, 94 L.ed 55; 70 S.Ct. 26. 
'l'he Suprerne Court of Utah reached the same con-
clusion as the main opinion in the Kreager case, supra, 
in Pcicr8on t'. O.f; ... R. ~D.~ 110 U. 573, 175 P.2d 744, 
another case decided before the Supreine Court holding 
in the Boyd case, supra, put the matter to rest. This 
a.ouin ,,·as an FELA case where the railroad obtained 
c 
aa agreen1ent from an injured employee limiting his 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
potential suit for damages to the United States District 
Court. Justice Wolfe, speaking for the court majority 
held that such a provision was contrary to the federal act 
and void. In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Larsen 
rejected any bar by the federal act, but held "the great 
weight of authority as well as the indicated policy of the 
state, as shown by the construction and the pronounce-
ments of the court, are to the effect that this contract 
if interpreted as the trial court interpreted it should not 
be enforceable." (The trial court had held the limitation 
provision valid. ) 
All of these cases arising under the FELA are con-
cerned with a provision limiting jurisdiction of a suit 
for injuries which had been suffered before the agree-
ment was entered into. Thus, even statements such as 
Judge Hand's are not authority for the situation where 
the provision is found in an agreement executed before 
any cause of action exists. 
The cases found in three A.L.R. annotations, supra 
show that there is nearly universal holding that if the 
limitation provision is executed before any right of 
action exists, it is void as against public policy. TJTilliston 
on Contracts~ Rev. ed. Vol. 6, p. 4871, Sec. 1725 also 
recites this general rule as follows : 
"The right of a party to legal redress if he is 
injured is jealously guarded by the courts and 
generally no agreetnent confining the right of a 
party to sue in a particular court ?r .tri?tn:al: or 
in the courts or tribunals of a certain JUrisdiction~ 
or to detern1ine the yenue of a suit in such a '"ay 
14 
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a~., to dcp.::i\Tc ti1e defendant of his statutory privi-
lege as to place of trial 'viii be enforced unless 
Inade after cause of action has arisen and part of 
a fair eon1 promise." 
(~.Defendant failed to make ti1nely a]J]Jlication for 
rejection of j uri8diction or change of venue and the 
lotL'er court prozJerly etcercised its discretion in this 
matter. 
'fhis court in the case of Cannon v. TuftJ 3 Ut.2d 
-~10; 285 P.2d 843, 845 held that a defendant must file a 
n1otion for a change of venue at his first appearance or 
at least clearly state his objections to venue in some 
IHU~lner at the first appearance. Defendant, Delta Oil 
Co. failed to make an objection in any form to the juris-
diction and venue of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County in its first appearance and merely filed an answer 
reciting six defenses, none of which touched upon the 
(1 uestion of venue or jurisdiction. It wasn't until the 
day before the case was pretried, namely, October 16!' 
1961, after it had been pending in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County for over one year that defendant in 
a belated a1nended answer questioned the propriety of 
the court in hearing this matter, and urged the proposi-
tions no'v contended for on this appeal in its points 
one and two. 
By its general appearance, the defendant waived 
any- objections based on the contractual provision, or 
th-e doctr]ne forurn non conveniens that it had against 
lhe rna ttel· being' heard and disposed of in the District 
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Court of Salt Lake County. See also, 78-13-9, U.C.A., 
1953, the section which indicates that the court may 
change a place of trial on motion. No motion was made 
by defendant in this regard until the morning of trial. 
(R. 36). 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been 
adopted into the Utah law under Sec. 78-13-9, U.C.A., 
1953, which recites the grounds that the court may, on 
motionJ change the place of trial. The material provision 
reads as follows : 
'' ( 3) \Vhen the convenience of witnesses and 
the ends of justice would be promoted by the 
change.'' 
This court in Mooney v. D. & R.G. RR.J 118 U. 
307, 221 P.2d 628 discusses the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and reviews many cases and leading articles 
on the subject. While this case was concerned with the 
attempted removal of an action brought under the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act in Utah by a railroad 
employee residing in Colorado and injured in Colorado, 
the court's language covered the application of the doc-
trine in this state to all suits. The court said at page 647: 
"Granting discretionary po,ver in the trial 
court to dismiss the cause for reasons of incon-
Yenience, the po,ver should only be exercised in 
exceptional circu1nstances and "Then an adequate 
showing has been made that the interests of jus-
tice require a trial in a more convenient fortnn. '' 
In this l\Iooney case, defendant appeared spe-
cially and n1oved to dis1niss based on supporting affi-
16 
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davits and testimony produced at the hearing on its 
n1otion indicating inconvenience. Here no affidavit 
or testimony was tendered in support of defendant's 
position, and all that was presented were the bare alle-
gations recited in defendant's second and third defense 
in its a1nended answer. 'I'he defendant alleged that it 
\ras prejudiced in the forum because the transactior1 
co11cerned Cuban property and that certain records and 
witnesses were in Cuba, and therefore unavailable to 
defendant, except at extreme cost. No offer of proof 
'\as ever made by defendant as to what these records 
were, what witnesses were needed, what this evidence 
"·as, or how it was material. 
rfhe other point urged by the defendant was the 
great cost of securing the law of Cuba in a form admis-
sible in evidence in the Utah court, but this contention 
appears also to be without merit because both sides 
provided the court such memoranda on Cuban law as 
they desired to by stipulation. 
In Winters v. Turner, 74 Ut. 222, 236; 278 Pac. 
816, 821, this court said with respect to an application 
for change of venue that: 
''r\.n application for a change of the place of 
trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
tr~al -eourt and its action will not be disturbed 
except for an abuse of discretion." 
(Citing in support of this proposition State v. Certain 
I11toxicating Liquors, 53 Ut. 171, 177, Pac. 23.) 
It is submitted that the court did not abuse its dis-
17 
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cretion in this matter where it appeared that defendant's 
actions attacking the forum were belated and unsupport-
able, and further, because there was no other apparent 
place that this case could be tried. Defendant in its 
brief acknowledged the unfriendly relations existing 
between Cuba and the United States and the court could 
take judicial notice of the fact that diplomatic relations 
had been severed bet\veen these countries at the time 
the defendant urged dismissal of this case. Further, it 
seems extremely doubtful that even if plaintiff could 
resort to the courts of Cuba, that he would be able to 
obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. While defendant 
urges that under Cuban law there is a rule authorizing 
"world-wide process" he did not cite any cases in juris-
dictions of this country upholding a judgment based 
upon such service. It is also basic that the parties by the 
provision regarding the courts of Havana, Cuba could 
not have conferred jurisdiction otherwise non-existent 
on the Cuban courts by reason of this provision. (See 
14 Am. J ur. 184.) 
POINT THREE 
THE PROMISSORY NOTES SUED 
UPON BY PLAINTIFF WERE INDEPEND-
ENT CONTRAC'"l,S, FULL AND COMPLETE 
ON THEIR FACE, ''riTHOUT AMBIGUITY, 
AND THESE N01,ES CLEARLY REQUIRED 
p 1\_\rl\IENT IN Al\IERICAN DOLLARS. 
18 
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POINT FOUR 
II1, XO'l,ES NOT J> A Y ABLE IN AMER-
Il'.r\N DOLLARS, THEN PAY ABLE IN 
l~lrl3/~.N PESOS, \\THil~H WERE A'_f PAR 
''T ITH 1\~IERICAN DOLLARS WHEN 
NOTES BECAME DUE. 
Defendant in its brief argued its third and fourth 
points together, contending in effect that there was no 
evidence presented to the lower court to justify a deter-
mination that the notes were payable in American cur-
rency or Cuban pesos. Defendant urged that although 
the notes were in English and spelled out the amount 
due as "Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) ", 
that as the notes were executed and payable in Cuba, 
this language could not mean, without additional proof, 
American dollars. 
By this argument defendant is attempting to make 
a new issue which was never presented to the lower court. 
The only issue concerning payment in the court below 
was whether the notes were each payable in $21,000.00 
United States currency or the value in dollars of United 
States currency of 21,000 Cuban pesos at the time each 
of the notes became due. 
Defendant in its "First Amended Original 
Answer", under the "Seventh Defense" contained there-
in, alleged as follows: 
"The defendant says that it is not liable to the 
plaintiff in the sum of $21,000.00 in currency of 
the United States of America on each said note, 
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but instead is only liable to the plaintiff in the 
sum of 42,000 pesos of the official currency of 
the Republic of Cuba at the time said notes 
became due." 
Because of this contention of the defendant, the plaintiff 
presented evidence that at the time the notes became due 
and payable the Cuban peso was at par with the 
American dollar and was being traded one Cuban peso 
for one American dollar. (R. 272). The jury also was 
presented a question as to the value of a Cuban peso in 
American dollars at the date the notes became due, and 
found as part of their special verdict that the value in 
American dollars of 21,000 Cuban pesos on September 
11, 1959, and also on December 11, 1959, was in each 
instance $21,000.00. (R. 56). For the defendant, at this 
stage of the case, to attempt to imply payment might 
have been intended in another currency other than 
American or Cuban, is contrary to defendant's own 
pleadings, and the issues presented to the lower court 
and cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. 
If, as contended by defendant, it was uncertain that 
the notes were actually payable in United States dollars 
because the parties to the notes had theretofore executed 
a contract in Spanish, reciting consideration would be 
payable in Cuban pesos, and that these notes partially 
paying such consideration were delivered in Cuba and 
payable in Cuba, such uncertainty would be resolved by 
looking to the currency of the place where the payments 
'rere to be 1nade. Thus, if there in fact ",.as such an 
uncertainty~ it ",.ould be resolved by determining that 
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the notes \Vere payable in Cuban pesos, 'vhich at the time 
\Vere equal to i\.Inerican dollars. (See 40 Am. Jur. Pay-
nu:nts~ Section 46, p. 745.) 
'fhe promissory notes sued upon we:r:e independent 
contracts 'vhich should be treated in accordance with the 
clear, unambiguous ter1ns contained therein, which 
specify that they are payable in dollars. That this means 
American dollars is obvious, and should be the inter-
pretation of any court from the attendant facts and 
circumstances, which show that the maker and the payee 
of the notes were both American citizens, dealing at a 
situs only some 90 miles from the United States main-
land, in a country whose currency is the peso and not 
the dollar. 
Other circun1stances requiring this determination 
as a matter of pure contract interpretation are the addi-
tional facts that all payments given by the defendant 
or its predecessors in interest toward the purchase of this 
Cuban property from the plaintiff show the consider-
ation paid for the contract was in American dollars, 
(R. II5, I08 Ex. II), and all rental payments made by 
defendant or its predecessors appear from the evidence 
to have been in American dollars. (Ex. I2-I5). 
It is submitted that the word "dollars" and the 
dollar mark designation ($) on notes given by an Amer-
ican corporation to an American citizen clearly show 
an intent to pay the 11otes in U.S. currency. In 27B 
c-·.J.S., Dollar~ p. 974, "dollar" is defined as follows: 
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"an unambiguous term, having a settled mean-
ing at law; it necessarily implies money, and has 
reference to the legal currency or 1nediu1n of 
exchange in use in this country (citing (}oak v. 
State~ 196 S.W. 922, 924; 130 Ark. 90; State v. 
Downs~ 47 N.E. 671, 148 Ind. 324) as distin-
guished from foreign money (citing Thompson 
v. State~ 234 S.W. 406, 90 Tex. Cr. 125) ." 
As to the dollar mark designation of value found on the 
notes immediately preceding the numerals, the authors 
on page 975 state: 
"The usual marks expressive of dollars and 
cents, when employed according to general and 
long practice, may, to that extent, be treated as 
part of our language by adaptation and use." 
'l.,he cases cited by defendant do not support its 
position. In Biern,e v. Brown~s Adm.~ 10 ''r·'.,. a. 748, the 
court was concerned with legislation enacted by the l\T est 
\Tirginia legislature to modify the disasterous effect of 
the collapse of Confederate currency and the attempt 
thereby to uphold contracts on a reasonable basis. This 
case merely revie,vs the legislation in light of a particular 
contract. In Omohundro~s Exec. v. Crump_, 18 Grattans 
Reports, 763 ,.,.. a., the question "~as whether or not a note 
recited to be payable in dollars could be paid in Con-
federate notes, then worthless. The court did not hold, 
as defendant asserts, that the note meant Confederate 
specie, but on the contrary held, the legal presumption 
that parties intend legal tender, which was gold and 
silver and not c~onfederate notes, overcame the contrary 
evidenee of intent presented. The court there said the 
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"·ord "dollars" has a definite signification fixed by law, 
and that it is laid down that "where the words have a 
kno\\"n legal tneaning, such, for example, as measures 
of quantity fixed by statute parol evidence, that the 
parties intended to use them in a sense different from 
their legal meaning~ though it was still the customary 
meaning, is not admissible." (citing cases) The case of 
Cornmonwealth v. Stearnes~ 5 Mass. 256 was a criminal 
case concerned about the sufficiency of the allegations of 
an indictment charging counterfeiting under the laws 
of Massachusetts. 
There is no prohibition under Cuban law against 
contracts or notes payable, in American dollars. The 
affidavit of J. Justin Franco (R. 44-51) establishes that 
under substantive Cuban law, contracts made in Cuba, 
providing for payment in dollars, are properly recover-
able in American dollars, which are the only kind of 
dollars known in Cuba. The Cuban law, therein recited, 
provides that parties may stipulate payment in a dollar 
amount, or in any other type or kind of consideration, 
and that such special payment is recoverable under the 
Cuban law. In other words, the Cuban courts themselves 
\vould enforce these promissory notes a11d require pay-
ment thereof in American dollars. 
POINT FIVE 
THE REJECTED EVIDENCE WAS 
XOT REPORT SHEE,.fS OF A REGISTERED 
TRA~SFER AGENT, BUT ONLY TESTI-
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l\10NY AS TO W"HA'f COPIES OJi, SUCI-I 
SHEETS WHICH HAD BEEN SENT 'fO 
'l,HE DEJ:i-,ENDAN'l-, REFLECTED, \\rHlCfl 
TES'I'llVIONY WAS HEARSAY AND NO'l, 
ADMISSIBLE. SUCH REJECTED 'fESTI-
lVIONY IN ANY EVENT 'VAS I~Il\IATE­
RIAL AND I'fS REJECTION UNPREJ-UDI-
CIAL TO rrHE DEJi-,ENDANT, IN LIGHT 
OF THE JURY'S ~--,INDING THAT NO 
S'l"OCK HAD BEEN DELI\rERED TO 
PLAIN'l,IFF AS SECURI~ry OR PLEDGE 
FOR THE NOTES, AS CONTENDED BY 
DEFENDANT. 
In stating this fifth point defendant implies that 
stock~ transfer sheets were offered by it and rejected on 
the objection of hearsay . .r\. careful reading of defend-
ant's argurnent, however, reveals the true fact that 
the rejected hearsay testimony was an attempt to haYe 
the defendant's past president, Doerrie, testify that he 
had noticed from the copies of the transfer records sent 
defendant company by its registered transfer agent in 
New Jersey that there had been a transfer of the stock 
certificates '" hich had been delivered to l\Ir. Schenin 
as security for the notes. Defendant claims that the 
eourt. in refusing to pern1it an answer to this question, 
erred, so that "this appellant '"as deprived of proving 
t-he date of the transfer and the Yalue of stock on such 
date." 
Defendant's "·itness Doerrie did in fact testify that 
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the t\vo stock certi:fica tes he claimed he had g1ven 
Schenin, totalling 42,000 shares, had been transferred 
( ll. 2-it>) and that he kne'v Schenin had transferred this 
stock before October 11, 1955 (R. 251); and further 
that on that date Schenin ad1nitted to him such transfer. 
( R. 24!8-249). '_fhe only matter defendant was precluded 
fron1 sho,ving by the rejected testimony was the date 
of the claimed transfer, in order to be able to establish 
the value of the stock on that date. 
This proof of date of transfer is not now material, 
and the defendant cannot now show any prejudice in 
its exclusion, in light of the jury's answer to Question 
X o. 5 in the special verdict submitted to it, that the 
defendant had not in fact delivered 42,000 shares of 
stock to the plaintiff or his agent as security for the pay-
ment of the notes. By this answer the jury found that 
no stock \vas involved in this case and therefore the value 
of any stock as of a particular day was immaterial. The 
jury did not answer Question 6 also submitted to it, 
\Yhich only needed answering if they had found that 
stock had been pledg~d, and which requested them to 
find the value of such pledged stock on the day it might 
have been transferred. 
Even if the jury's answer to Question 5 had been 
"yes", indicating stock had been pledged, this testimony 
as to "~hat Doerrie had seen on a copy of transfer record 
\\~as clearly objectionable. A registered transfer agent 
is not an employee, as contended by plaintiff, but rather 
an independent contractor whose records could be intro-
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duced upon a proper authentication through a person 
having the custody and knowledge of such records. A 
stock transfer agent., particularly one located some 1,000 
miles from the offices of the corporation, clearly rneets 
all the tests of being an independent contractor, viz., 
the right to perform certain work according to his own 
methods, without being subject to the control of its 
employer except as to the product or result of his work. 
(See 27 Am. Jur. Independent Contractors_, Section 2, 
page 481.) 
Another objectionable aspect of the rejected testi-
mony was the fact that it was not the best evidence, the 
transfer records themselves being the best evidence as 
to what they show, rather than the recollection of the 
witness as to what he noticed thereon. There was no 
showing that this primary evidence was unavailable to 
defendant. Even if there had been an attempt to intro-
duce such transfer records and a proper foundation 
laid therefor, it is subtnitted they still might be objec-
tionable as not being the best evidence, for _the stock 
certificates themselves 'vhich were returned by the trans-
fer agent to the defendant company (R. 2-1<7) 'vould be 
the best evidence of their transfer. Such certificates 'vere 
not presented by the defendant. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
}1,0lTND 'ri-I1\ T 'fHE AC,T OF THE DEFF4X-
D..c\~'r P 1-\ \"'"ING RENT..c\L PA l,..~IEXTS 'f() 
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'fHE Pl.J.t\.IN'l,I~,F ~-,OR TRAXS~IIT'"f.c\.L TO 
'filE LESSORS \\r .i\.S NO'"l, 1-\ COLLATERAL 
-l\(~lt.EE)lEN1, OR PART OIT THE ''rRIT-
'f}:X l~ON'"rRAC'f OF SALE BE'l1 \\rEEN 
'filE PAR11 IES RESULTING IN THE 
\\"l{l'l'TEN NO'l,ES SUED ON, AND A 
lT.t\IL URE BY PLAINTIF,F TO PAY ON 
SUCH REN'l,ALS ''r AS THUS NOT A DE-
FEXSE TO A SUIT BY PLAINTIFF ON 
THE NOTES. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 1,HE 
P ARrriES DID NO'f REQUIRE ANY CON-
'flXUING OBLIGA'"fiON BY PLAIN'"fiF1? 
}_,OR FURTHER PERFOR:\IANCE AND BY 
ITS TERMS EXPRESSLY RELIEv"""ED 
PI~AINTIFF 0}-, ANY FURTHER LIA-
BILIT1~ FOR FUTURE AC1,IONS REGARD-
ING THE PROPERTY CONVEYED TO 
THE DEFENDAN'l\ 
As in previous points, defendant urged its two 
points in one argument. Because they seem to be bas-
ically the same proposition, plaintiff will respond in the 
same manner. 
X o issue "~as submitted to the jury for determina-
tion of fact as to 'vhether the parties had agreed orally 
or otherwise respecting the rental payments due on the 
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mine, and whether any such agreement was a part of 
the written agreement of sale ( Exhs. 4 and 5) between 
the parties, which resulted in the notes sued upon. ~'or 
was there any demand by the defendant for the sub-
Inission of such issues to the jury for a findn1g of fact 
thereon. 
Rule 4-9( a) U.R.C.P. provides that in such a cir-
cumstance it shall be dee1ned that the trial court made a 
finding on any unsubmitted fact issue in accord with the 
judgment. In other words, it must be determined that 
the trial court found that the actions of defendant in 
making rental payments to the plaintiff following the 
execution of the written agreement between the1n \vas 
not as a result of said agreement nor of a collateral agree-
ment that was a part thereof so that a failure to pay on 
such rental payments to the lessors by plaintiff did not 
constitute a breach of the agreement of sale between the 
parties relieving defendant of the obligation of making 
payments on the promissory notes sued upon. 
Such a finding by the court was not only proper, 
but compelled by the evidence, and the applicable rules 
of law. The evidence, contrary to defendant's contention, 
did uot show an understanding between the parties 
about rental payments in the forn1 of a collateral agree-
rnent "' hich v•as an exception to the parol eYidence rule. 
'l,he eYidence simply showed that an oral agreement 'vas 
reached bet,veen Jack Cayias and plaintiff regarding the 
sand tnine in .1\.ugust, 1958 under 'vhich agreement plain-
tiff ''"as to receiYe $20,000 and Cayias the right to oper-
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ate the 1nine. (R. 114-115). Plaintiff initially received 
~~,000 iu cash at the time of the oral understanding, and 
subsequently on August 28, 1958 was given the balance 
of $1 {),000 iu the form of a check on the account of Jack 
Cayias in a Salt Lake City bank. This check, after 
deposit by plaintiff, \vas returned to him marked '"in-
sufficient funds." (Ex. 11, R. 115). 
~_,allowing the return of this check, plaintiff re-
quested Cayias, "·ho under the verbal agreement was to 
1nake all future rental payments required on the sand 
n1ine leases to the lessors, to make such rental payments 
to the plaintiff so that he could be sure the payments 
"·ere being made. (R. 196). This arrangement was 
obYiously for plaintiff's protection for all he then had 
"·as an oral agreement that Cayias would pay rentals 
and develop and operate the mine for their joint benefit. 
There "·as no evidence presented of any arrangement 
"·ith defendant regarding the payment of rentals and 
the testimony indicated that the defendant, after execut-
ing the 'vritten agreement, merely continued the prac-
tice begun by Cayias some n1onths before, after his check 
had bounced, of making the rental payments to the plain-
tiff for transmittal on to the lessors. (R. 196). 
The evidence clearly shows that all prior oral agree-
nlents or understandings regarding the sand mine be-
t\\·een the plaintiff, Jack Cayias, Doerrie, or any others 
\Vere merged into the written agreement between plain-
tiff and defendant of :\larch 10, 1959 (Exs. 4 and 5) 
and the trial court so indicated. (R. 252). 
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A review of the written agreement between the 
parties (Ex. 5) shows that it is a complete, clear, and 
unambiguous agreement and not as contended by de-
fendant, merely a partial execution of a parol agree1nent. 
This complete docwnent specifically excludes the pro-
position that a collateral agreement regarding lease pay-
tnents was not covered by its terms. 
After describing in detail the leaseholds and per-
sonal property owned by Jacobs and his source of title 
thereto, and indicating that all contracts both for the 
personal property and the leases were given to defend-
ant, the agreement provides as follows: 
"FOURTH: That taking into effect every-
thing that has been agreed Mister SID 
JACOBS sells, leases and transfers by this docu-
ment in favor of DELTA OIL CO~IPAXl""" 
of UTAH all rights that correspond to the 
mines and sand and gravel deposits related to 
the Second Clause of this Agreement as of this 
day, all the contracts previously drawn with the 
owners of the farms "'here his mine is located, and 
DELTA OIL COMPAN1""" OF UTAH is 
therefore free to exercise all the rights required 
and is bound to cotnply all the obligations per-
taining to l\Iister SID JACOBS on said con-
tracts. It is also agreed that DELT1\. OIL 
CO)IP .t\.N1 ... 0~~ U'l"'AH, has taken possession 
of all the equipment and machinery, and fron1 
this day on assutnes all responsibility for future 
puyn1ents that corresponds to l\Iister J .£\C.OBS. 
l~IF"'Til: The selling price is the sum of 
Ei(rhtv-}-.,ive 'Thousand Dollars ($85,000.00) 
t-1 • 
that ~I~ster J ..t\l~OBS has made effective by 
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sig·ning these documents, and "~ith no need of a 
formal receipt or Letter of Credit in favor of 
DEL'rr\. OIL CO~IP ..:'\_NY OF U'"l~-L\.H. 
)lister ,J AC,OBS is not responsible for an evic-
tion of the real estate transferred and sold in this 
document, but only to the legitimacy of the real 
estate that has been sold and of the legitimacy 
of the contracts on the farms sold to him by its 
owners on a previous date." 
,-l'he foregoing provisions clearly indicate the 
responsibility of defendant to make rental payments to 
the lessors and that plaintiff is not responsible for any 
future actions or defaults with respect to the leases or 
contracts, and is only responsible for their validity or 
legitimacy as of the sale date. 
It is submitted that in this case the parol evidence 
rule '"auld clearly prevent the enforcement of a prior or 
collateral oral agreement between the parties regarding 
rental payments, as called for by the defendant. 
''Tilliston on Contracts, Vol. 2, Rev. Ed. Sec. 631 
at page 1813 provides as follows: 
"Parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence 
or one of interpretation or construction, but is a 
rule of substantive la'v 'vhich 'vhen applicable 
defines the li1nits of a contract. It fixes the subject 
matter for interpretation though not itself a rule 
of interpretation.'' 
and at page 1817: 
"1\Jl courts agree that if the parties have inte-
grated their agreement into a single written 
memorial, all prior negotiations and agreements 
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in regard to the same subject matter are excluded 
from consideration whether they were oral or 
written.'' 
and at page 1821, the author further states that it is 
"generally held that the contract must appear on 
its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol 
evidence of additional ter1ns." 
F,or many cases, including some Utah cases, reciting the 
general principle that where the parties to a contract 
have deliberately put their engagement in writing with-
out any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such 
enagement, it is conclusively presumed that the entire 
agreement of the parties and the extent and manner of 
their undertaking have been reduced to writing see 
20 Am. Jur.~ Evidence~ para. 1099, page 958. In other 
words, the parol agreement is merged in the written 
agreement, and that all parol testimony of prior or con-
temporaneous conversations or declarations tending to 
make a new and different contract are incompetent. (See 
also 5 Wigmore~ Evidence~ Sec. 2400, page 236, and 
Restatement of Contracts~ Sees. 237-244.) 
The law relied on by defendant to avoid the parol 
evidence rule relates to a situation 'vhere there is an oral 
agreement "·hich is executed by subsequent delivery of 
documents. Such clearly is not the case now before this 
( .... ourt ,vhere prior oral agreements were merged into 
the "·ritten agreement of sale (Exs. 4 and 5), ""hich 
in turn produced the ""ritten override (Ex. 6) and the 
t\YO notes being sued upon. ( Exs. I and 2) . 
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'fhe only ease cited by defendant supporting its 
position is 11 aluz t,. Doolittle, 18 '\r is. :!06 "·hich was an 
action to recover consideration paid for a note and mort-
gage sold by assig11ment from defendant to plaintiff. 
Both parties knew the Inortgagor was financially ir-
responsible, but defendant had represented the mortgage 
as valid. It subsequently appeared that the mortgagor 
had no title and therefore both note and mortgage were 
"·orthless. Defendant relied on the general rule that 
"·hen parties reduce an agree1nent to writing the writing 
is presumed to contain the 'vhole agreement and other 
conditions cannot be shown by parol. The Court held 
that ,vhile there was no rule better settled then this one, 
it "·as inapplicable to an instrument (assignment) which 
from its very nature did no! attempt to state the entire 
agreen1ent but was adopted merely to transfer title. This 
case only stands for the proposition that the presump-
tion that a 'vriting contains the whole agreement does 
not apply to deeds, assignments, and similar instru-
ments. 
Even if defendant might have proved an enforce-
able agreement between the plaintiff and defendant 
"Therein plaintiff had assumed for a valid consideration 
the obligation of paying the rental payments delivered 
him by defendant, the breach by plaintiff of such an 
agreement would not be a valid defense to a suit on these 
t\\·o promissory notes which are independent and sep-
arate contracts. These notes were supported by a valu-
able consideration when they were given and were un-
conditional promises to pay money at a particular time. 
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Parol evidence in contradiction of the terms of these 
notes cannot be used to defeat payment thereon. (See 
Van Fleet-Durkee Inc. v. Oyster, 205 P.2d 32.) 
The only thing plaintiff might attempt in such a 
circumstance would be to show that such an agreement 
was a subsequent agreement and therefor not invalid 
under the parol evidence rule or a separate independent 
agreement for plaintiff's services. Defendant in that 
situation could possibly_ sue plaintiff for a breach of a 
subsequent independent agreement to perform services 
for it and attempt to prove its damages as a result of 
the breach by plaintiff thereof. 
Defendant did not attempt to do this, for the testi-
mony of all the witnesses showed that the arrangement 
to make rental payments to the plaintiff was not a valid 
agreement supported by consideration, subsequent to 
the written agreement of March 11, 1959, nor collateral 
thereto, and that it simply arose as a result of plain-
tiff's request to Cayias so1netime in 1958 after the 
Cayias check had been returned and that no other 
arrangements were made between defendant and plain-
tiff. 
Another and even more compelling reason why 
defendant did not atten1pt to establish an independent 
subsequent agree1nent to perform these services by the 
plaintiff 'vas that it could not show that it suffered any 
d:.unage as a result of the plaintiff's failure to pay on 
the rental payn1ents. Defendant voluntarily abandoned 
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its right in the Cuban sand property and in the equip-
nlent for operating it in October of I959, at which time 
so far as it knew its leases and possessary rights had 
never been terminated or impaired. (R. 240). 
'fhe jury's findings did not determine when or how 
the leases were supposed to have terminated. Defendant 
in its brief also fails to make this certain other than to 
,.. 
allege it occurred following the written agreement of 
)larch II, I959. If defendant contends the leases auto-
matically terminated upon failure to pay a 1nonths rent 
the evidence is clear that such forfeiture would be the 
result of defendant's own failure to pay the May I959 
rental payment. Defendants proof of rental payment 
sho,ved that the only rental payments made by it to 
plaintiff was the April I, I959 payment, evidenced by a 
receipt (Ex. I3), the June I, I959 payment, evidenced 
by a check (Ex. I2), two months' subsequent payments, 
evidenced by a receipt, undated (Ex. I4), and the pay-
nlent of $3,000 in October of I959, which Doerrie said 
made up for several months' rental payments that 
defendant had been delinquent in paying. (R. 24I, 242). 
The acknowledgment by defendant's president that 
defendant had missed several pay1nents and then had 
made them up clearly sho"·s that the leases had no auto-
matic termination date. Plaintiff himself testified that so 
far as he knew the leases had never been terminated 
by the lessor for no payment of rental (R. I94, I95) and 
that no one representing defendant had ever advised 
him of such termination. (R. 20I). Plaintiff established 
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by written checks that he had made the rental payments 
up to May 1, 1959. (Ex. 17}. 
It is clear this voluntary gratuitious service of plain-
tiff to defendant was not a condition or part of the 
written agreement between the parties and in no way 
affected the obligation to pay the promissory notes. Any 
attempt to limit an unconditional promise to pay found 
in negotiable promissory notes by parole evidence that 
such promise was contingent upon the performance of 
future actions by the payee must be unsuccessful. 
Defendant, by its failure and inability to plead and 
prove an independent enforceable agreement by plain-
tiff to pay rentals on behalf of defendant, and to show 
any damages to it resulting from loss of the leaseholds, 
received all that it possibly could have from the trial 
court when it was given a set-off against its obligation 
for the amount of the notes in the amount of the rentals 
paid by defendant to plaintiff which plaintiff couldn't 
show by documentary evidence he had paid on to the 
lessors. 
POINT EIGHT 
RULE 49 (a) U.R.C.P. AUTHORIZES 
'fHE l"'OURT TO REQUIRE A JURY TO 
RE1~URN A SPECIAL 'TERDICT IN THE 
FOll~l 0~-, SPECIAL ''TRITTEN FINDINGS 
{:J.>ON THE ISSUES, AND PRO,riDES 
TIIr\ T IF TI-lE COUR'l, OMITS ANY ISSl__1E 
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0~, ~.,.r\.l~T RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS 
OR 'I'HE E\TIDJ~NCE, A PARTY ''TAl\rES 
'fHE RIGHT '1,0 A TRIAL BY JURY OF 
THE ISSUE SO O~liT'fED, UNLESS HE 
DE:\I.t\NDS I'I'S SUBMISSION, AND IF NO 
DJ~:)l1\.XD IS ~I.t\.DE, THE COURT SHALJ..J 
llE DEEMED TO HAVE MADE A FIND-
ING IN ACCORD WI'l,H THE JUDG.NIENT 
.1\.S 'fO SUCH OMITTED ISSUE. 
On page 12 of the defendant's brief it lists an 
"'Eighth Point," 'vhich provides as follows: 
"'Vhen a case is submitted to the jury upon 
the special verdict, all material, controverted 
issues must be submitted to the jury, and the fail-
ure to submit the issue, the answer to which is 
necessary to recovery in law, is fatal and cannot 
be cured by any finding of the court." 
Although this point is recited, it is not argued. For that 
reason plaintiff will only state that this proposition 
urged by defendant is contrary to Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P. 
(See also discussion of this rule under plaintiff's points 
Six and Seven.) 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff in conclusion respectfully submits that 
the judgment of the District Court was lawful and 
proper for the following reasons: 
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I. The court had jurisdiction of the case, which it 
properly exercised, over the untimely application of 
the defendant to dismiss. 
2. The notes sued upon could only be paid in either 
American dollars or Cuban pesos, and in either case the 
obligation of the defendant amounted to $21,000.00 
United States currency on each note. 
3. There was no error in the testimony rejected by 
the Court as to the date of transfer of the stock certif-
icates, and defendant was not prejudiced by such 
rejection. 
4. Plaintiff's action in failing to pay rental pay-
ments received from defendant and any subsequent lease 
termination as result thereof, did not create a defense 
available to defendant to avoid liability on the promis-
sory notes sued upon. 
5. The liability of the maker of negotiable promis-
sory notes containing unconditional promises to pay 
cannot be defeated by the maker presenting parol evi-
dence that such unconditional promise was contingent 
upon the performance of future acts by the party. 
It is respectfully suggested that while defendant 
presented many defenses, none of them reflected the 
real reason its new officers attempted to avoid defend-
ant's obligations on these notes; namely, that the drastic 
changes wrought by the Castro regime in Cuba soon 
after defendant's acquisition of the sand mine made its 
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projected mining· venture impossible and the acquired 
. '
property valueless. That all defendant's defenses were 
factually unfounded is apparent from the significant 
actions of the defendant's then president, Theo Doerrie, 
in paying the delinquent monthly rental payments in 
October of 1959, when defendant had decided to aban-
don the property, and President Doerrie's undisputed 
acknowledgments to the plaintiff after the notes had 
become due in Septmeber and December of 1959, that 
defendant would pay them as soon as a merger was 
accomplished. (R. 200, 240). 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
EDWARD NATHAN 
515 Madison Avenue 
New York City, New York 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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